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Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name:
Lemkin's Word, Darfur, and the UN Report
David Luban*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DISAPPEARING GENOCIDE
IN DARFUR
Every student of a foreign language learns about "false friends"-words in
a new language that look like words in your own but mean something different.
In French, "expdrience" means "experiment," not "experience." In German
"Konkurrenf' means "competition," while the English "concurrence" means
"agreement"-in antitrust terms, the opposite of competition.
Legal language, too, contains false friends-technical legal terms that
closely resemble words in ordinary language but mean something different.
Twenty-five years ago, as a young philosophy teacher with no legal training, I
taught my first case ever in a law school classroom. It contained the word
"consideration," and I proceeded on the natural assumption that a "good
consideration" means "an important thing to think about" rather than "a thing
of value given to form a contract." The results were predictably comic.
But the result can be tragic as well. On January 25, 2005, the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur ("UN Commission" or "Commission")
presented its report ("UN Darfur Report" or "Report") to UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan.' The Commission, chaired by the eminent international
jurist Antonio Cassese, did a meticulous job of investigating possible
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international crimes in Darfur. Newspaper headlines summarized the Cassese
Commission's findings a few days later: U.N. Finds Crimes, Not Genocide in
Dafur,2 U.N. Panel Finds No Genocide in Dafur but Urges Tribunals,3 Murder-But
No Genocide,4 Dafur 'CriminalBut Not Genocide,'" and Sudan's Dafur Crimes Not
Genocide, Says U.N. Report.6 Nearly identical headlines appeared in the Chicago
Tribune,7 the Queensland Courier Mail,8 the St. Petersburg Times,9 the Irish
Times,' ° and the Financial Times."
Most revealing are headlines from the Herald Sun in Melbourne (Horrors
Short of Genocide),'2 the Glasgow Herald (UN 'Clears Sudan of Genocide' in Dafur),3
and London's Daily Telegraph (UN Confusion as Sudan Conflict is No Longer
'Genocide).14 Plainly, "short of genocide" means "not as bad as genocide."
"Clears Sudan of genocide" means exoneration-and, coming just two days
after headlines declaring that Sudanese officials denied bombing a village in
Darfur, headline-scanners could be excused for believing that the UN report had
disproven atrocity reports in Darfur. And "UN confusion" as the Darfur
catastrophe is "no longer 'genocide"' shows the baleful results. The UN no
longer knew what to do, because without the word "genocide," the mandate for
action disappears.
Months earlier, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell had labeled
the Darfur atrocities "genocide."' 5 Many people remembered that the Clinton
administration went through humiliating contortions to avoid the "G-word" out
2

Warren Hoge, UN Finds Crimes, Not Genocide in Darfur,NY Times A3 (Feb 1, 2005).

3

Colum Lynch, UN Panel Finds No Genocide in Darfur but Urges Tribunals, Wash Post A01 (Feb 1,
2005).

4

Murder-ButNo Genocide, Scotsman 25 (Feb 2, 2005).

5

Darfur 'CriminalBut Not Genocide', Australian 10 (Feb 2, 2005).
Ewen MacAskill, Sudan's Darfur Crimes Not Genocide, Says UN Report, Guardian (London) 12 (Feb

6

1, 2005).
7
8
9
10
1

UN Panel DarfurAbuses 'Systematic, 'Not Genocide, Chi Trib 5 (Feb 1, 2005).
Evelyn Leopold, Sudanese Killings Not Genocide: UN,Courier Mail (Queensland) 15 (Feb 2, 2005).
UN PanelSees No Genocide in Darfur,St Petersburg Times (Florida) 2A (Feb 1, 2005).
Ewen MacAskill, No Proofof Genocide in Sudan, UN Study Finds,Irish Times 8 (Feb 1, 2005).
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Mark Turner, Sudan Ki1hngs in Dafur Not Genocide, Says UN Report, Fin Times 7 (Feb 1, 2005).
HorrorsShort of Genocide, Herald Sun (Melbourne) 34 (Feb 2, 2005).
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Daniel Balint-Kurti Abuja, UN 'Clears Sudan of Genocide' in Dafur, Herald (Glasgow) 10 (Feb 1,
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2005).
Alec Russel, UN Confusion as Sudan Conflict is No Longer 'Genocde', Daily Telegraph (London) 12
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(Feb 2, 2005). A nearly identical headline appeared in The Mercury of Australia.
Secretary of State Coin L. Powell, The Crisis in Darfur, Written Remarks to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (Sept 9, 2004), available online at <http://www.usembassy.it/
file2004_O9/alia/A4090908.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2006).
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of fear of being required to do something about genocide in Rwanda.' 6 Powell's
forthright use of the forbidden word suggested to many that the Bush
administration would be different-better and more honest. "Not on my
watch," were George W. Bush's famous words about genocide inaction.17
Bolstering the hope that the United States would help halt the Darfur atrocities
was the fact that Christian groups belonging to President Bush's core
constituency were pushing for US action. 8 These groups had been concerned
about Sudan for years because of the massacre of Christians in the North-South
civil war-and now, for admirable reasons of principle, they were not about to
back off simply because the victims were Muslims. In 2004, the US Congress
passed a resolution condemning the Darfur atrocities, and self-consciously
labeled them genocide. 9
It was less well-known that, contrary to the fears of the Clinton
administration, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
20
of Genocide ("Genocide Convention") imposes no legal obligation to act.
Nevertheless, existing political pressure on both the United Nations and the
United States ultimately might have turned the tide. But the UN Commission's
report deflated the sense of urgency about Darfur. In Spring 2005, both houses
of the US Congress introduced tough legislation on behalf of Darfur-the
Darfur Accountability Act.2' By that time, however, Colin Powell was gone and
the Bush administration, preoccupied with Iraq, did not want a mandate to do
something drastic in Sudan. The White House wrote to Congressional leaders
requesting removal of the strongest portion of the Darfur Accountability Act-a
broad authorization to act-from a crucial appropriations bill and in May

16

17

Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families:Stories
from Rwanda 152-53 (Farrar, Straus 1998) (quoting and discussing press statements made on June
10, 1994 by a State Department spokesperson).
Elizabeth Rubin, If Not Peace, ThenJustice, NY Times Magazine 42 (Apr 2, 2006).

18

Samantha Power, Dying in Dafur,New Yorker 56 (Aug 30, 2004).

19

H Con Res 467, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (une 24, 2004).

20

Article 1 of the Genocide Convention obligates its parties to "undertake to prevent and to
punish" the crime of genocide, but Article 6 makes it dear that the obligation to punish genocide
applies only to genocide committed within the state's own territory, and international lawyers
generally assume that the legal obligation to prevent genocide has no wider extension than
genocide within a state's own territory. This conclusion is reinforced by Article 8, which states
that parties to the Convention may call on the UN Security Council to take actions for prevention
and suppression of genocide. There is no suggestion that states must act on their own to suppress
genocide in other states. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Jan 12, 1951), 78 UNTS 277 (hereinafter Genocide Convention). See generally William
A. Schabas, Genodde in InternationalLaw: The Crimes of Crimes 491-502 (Cambridge 2000).
Darfur Accountability Act of 2005, S 495, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 2, 2005); Darfur Peace and
Accountability Act, HR 3127, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (June 30, 2005).
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Congress complied. 2 Although President Bush quickly reiterated the view that
genocide is occurring in Darfur, he did so only after the Darfur Accountability
Act had been weakened at the White House's request.23

Obviously, we will never be certain that the UN Darfur Report directly
deflated the Bush administration's commitment to Darfur action. But the
Report, together with the resulting news reports, made the struggle for Darfur
intervention more difficult by undercutting efforts by Darfur action groups to
mobilize public support. With headlines such as Murder-But No Genodde,24 the
motivation to intervene was gone. Murder is bad, to be sure-but murder is
ordinary. One might lobby Congress to do something about genocide, but who
ever heard of lobbying Congress to stop foreigners from murdering each other?
Foreigners murder each other all the time. Genocide sounds like it might be our
business, but "mere" murder is theirs.
Strikingly, all those damaging headlines actually reflected a horrible
misunderstanding of the UN Commission's conclusions. The Report contained
no factual exonerations. More importantly, the Report insisted that the war
crimes and crimes against humanity that it found in Darfur are just as evil and
just as legally significant as genocide. However, the Commission made this point
in a maddeningly legalistic manner: it pointed out that trial chambers in the
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals had referred to genocide as the "crime of
crimes"-but they were reversed by their Appellate Chambers, which held that
there is no hierarchy among international crimes.2 5 This pettifogging mode of
argument vividly illustrates how disconnected the law of genocide has become
from the generally accepted meaning of the word. To everyone in the world
other than a handful of international lawyers, genocide is the "crime of crimes,"
regardless of what the judges on Appellate Chambers in The Hague say. And the
Commission's effort to insist that the crimes in Darfur are not genocide (though
they are just as evil) not only swims upstream against the force of language, it
argues its conclusion not on moral or factual grounds, but on the grounds that a

22

23

24
25

Mark Leon Goldberg, Zoellick's Appeasement Tour, American Prospect 4 (Apr, 2005) (describing
Apr 25, 2005 letter from the White House's Office of Management and Budget to Rep Jerry
Lewis); Nicholas D. Kristof, Day 113 of the President's Silence, NY Times A25 (May 3, 2005) (stating
that the author has a copy of President Bush's letter to Congressional leaders "instructing them to
delete provisions about Darfur from the legislation").
Unsurprisingly, then, the announcement of the President's statement that genocide is happening
in Darfur was buried deep in the inside pages of the Washington Post. See Jim VandeHei, In

Break With UN, Bush Calls Sudan Ilngs Genocide, Wash Post A19 (June 2, 2005).
Murder-But No Genocide, Scotsman at 25 (cited in note 4).
505-06 (cited in note 1). For a powerful argument in favor
See UN Darfur Report at 128-29,
view,
see
Allison Marston Danner, Constructinga Hierarchy of Crimes in
of the "hierarchy of crimes"
InternationalCiminalLawSentencing, 87 Va L Rev 415, 472-83 (2001).
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handful of judges say so. The Commission's conclusion that the situation in
Darfur was not a genocide turned on fine points of the technical definition of
genocide contained in the Genocide Convention and subsequently incorporated
into the International Criminal Court ("ICC ' ) Statute and national legislation.
Thus, when the Melbourne Herald Sun said that Darfur falls "short of
genocide, ' 26 it actually misrepresented the UN Darfur Report, which goes out of
its way to insist that genocide is not the "crime of crimes," and that crimes
against humanity are every bit as significant.
Equally striking, however, is the fact that no newspaper accounts actually
delved into the legal arguments to explain any of this. Apparently, the reporters
found the "no genocide" conclusion significant but did not want to strain their
readers' fragile attention with fine-grained technicalities about specific intent,
protected groups, and destruction of a group "as such"-the key legalisms in the
Genocide Convention. 27 This is entirely predictable: newspapers almost never
explain the legal reasoning behind exciting results. But it probably wouldn't have
mattered if the newspapers had been more careful. The fact is that the word
"genocide" has come to mean something different in the public imagination
than it means in the law. The word "genocide" has become a false friend.
II. THE MAKING OF A FALSE FRIEND
We tend to be dismissive about debates over word-meaning. "That's just
semantics" is a brusque dismissal in educated circles. Yet words matter. The
word "genocide" was coined by a polyglot lawyer named Raphael Lemkin nearly
sixty years ago. Lemkin understood that without a memorable word he could
never draw the world's attention to the uncanny crime that was his life's
obsession. His ear for linguistics was impeccable. 28 First published in an obscure,
largely unread, and nearly unreadable law book, Axis Rule in OccupiedEurope29-a
catalogue raisonn6 of Nazi legislation in occupied territory that revealed its
genocidal pattern-Lemkin's word eventually conquered the world. It became
one of the most powerful in any language, and it reshaped the moral landscape
of the world-arguably, more so than any other single linguistic innovation in
history. In doing so, it also reshaped our consciousness and, to some extent, it
reshaped our culture as well.
26

Horrors ofGenodde, Herald Sun (Melbourne) at 34 (cited in note 12).

27

See Genocide Convention, art 2 (cited in note 20).

28

See generally the splendid chapters on Lemkin in Samantha Power, 'A Problem From Hell": America

29

and the Age of Genodde (Perennial 2002). On Lemkin's quest for the "magic word," see id at 40-45.
Raphael Lemkin, Ais Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation,Analysis of Government, Proposalsfor
Redress 79-95 (Carnegie 1944). See also Michael Ignatieff, Lemkin's Ford,New Republic 25 (Feb
26, 2001).
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But words and culture shape each other, and culture did not leave Lemkin's
word untouched. To take one example of culture's pressure on the G-word, we
now tend to think that "genocide" is a label reserved for mass murders on the
scale of the Holocaust. If it is "only" a few thousand people, there will be those
who deny that it is genocide-a frequent refrain from do-nothings during the
Balkan Wars. But nothing in Lemkin's legal definition specifies a numbers
requirement, nor should it. The massacre of seven thousand men at Srebrenica
was just as genocidal as the gassing of millions at Auschwitz and Sobibor.
Lawyers are right to fight against popular word-meaning on this issue, because
otherwise it will be more difficult to use Lemkin's word to mobilize political
pressure against early-stage genocides or mass atrocities against smaller groups
than the European Jews.
In the UN Darfur Report, the culprit is not the numbers requirement, but
the fact that the definition of genocide requires that the crime be committed
with a certain specific intention.3 ° Prosecutors understand that specific intentions
are incredibly hard to prove, because criminals can perform the same act with
many possible intentions, and singling one out may be hard to do without a
confession or a smoking-gun document. This was precisely the problem that the
UN Commission confronted. Do the Janjaweed militias and their sponsors in
Sudan's government specifically intend to annihilate the tribes they are targeting
as such?31 Only if they do is it a genocide in legal terms. Or are they acting for
other reasons-perhaps to steal land, to crush the insurgency, or to create a
bloody example for other potential insurgents in Sudan? The evidence the UN
Commission found supports at least the latter reasons, but, the Commission
concluded, not the specific intention to annihilate the targeted tribes "as such."32
Organized extermination of civilian populations regardless of specific intent is,
under current legal definitions, a "crime against humanity." But it isn't genocide.
This is the point at which the legal word "genocide" becomes a false
friend. In everyday speech, we think of genocide as deliberate annihilation of
masses of civilians, regardless of the specific intention. That means that for nonlawyers-indeed, even for lawyers who have never studied the arcana of
international criminal law-the crime against humanity of exterminating civilian
populations is genocide. Hence, when the UN Commission denied that Darfur
was genocide, non-specialists could only conclude that there was no wholesale
extermination going on in Darfur. That is not what the UN Commission found,
30

See UN Darfur Report at 124-25, 128, 9 489-493, 502 (cited in note 1).

31

For background on the Janjaweed and the Darfur conflict, see id at 17-26,

32

98-126. An excellent and more detailed overview may be found in Gerard Prunier, Darfur The
Ambiguous Genodde (Cornell 2005).
UN Darfur Report at 130-32,
513-22 (cited in note 1).

40-72, and 31-37,
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and it is not what it said. But as the headlines indicate, it obviously is what
people thought the Commission had found and said. The legal and moral
meanings of the word "genocide" have parted ways. As a result, lawyers and
journalists talk past each other, and politicians suddenly find a convenient
linguistic excuse for doing nothing. That is not just semantics.33
III. GENOCIDE AND GROUP PLURALISM
Lemkin defined "genocide" thoughtfully, and a deep philosophical point
lay behind his definition. That point is that ethnic, racial, and religious groups
possess value as groups-value over and above the value of the individuals who
compose the groups. The individuals are valuable too, of course, and for those
committed to human rights and human dignity, the value of those individuals is
incalculable.
But humanity consists not only of many people-individualities in the
plural. It consists as well of many peoples-a plurality of groups as well as
individuals. Groups represent ways of life, imaginative visions of the good
worked out collectively over the course of generations. They represent the many
forms of human sociality and, in important respects, of human transcendence of
our finite individuality. For that reason, to annihilate a group is a crime that
diminishes humanity over and above the loss of the slaughtered individuals. In
Lemkin's words:
[N]ations are essential elements of the world community. The world
represents only so much culture and intellectual vigor as are created by its
component national groups. Essentially the idea of a nation signifies
constructive cooperation and original contributions, based upon genuine
traditions, genuine culture, and a well-developed national psychology. The
destruction of a nation, therefore, results in the loss of its future
contributions to the world. 34
33

This conclusion harmonizes with Beth Van Schaack's argument that the legal concept of
genocide, devised for use in international tribunals, should be distinguished and disentangled from
the knotty issues (political, legal, and moral) surrounding humanitarian intervention. Otherwise,
practical and theoretical objections to humanitarian intervention become obstacles to political
mobilization against genocidal campaigns. Beth Van Schaack, Dafurand the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26
Whittier L Rev 1101, 1103 (2005).

34

Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe at 91 (cited in note 29). Michael Ignatieff elaborates on
Lemkin's idea:
What it means to be a human being, what defines the very identity we share as
a species, is the fact that we are differentiated by race, religion, ethnicity, and
individual difference. These differentiations define our identity both as
individuals and as a species. No other species differentiates itself in this
individualized abundance. A sense of otherness, of distinctness, is the very
basis of the consciousness of our individuality, and this consciousness, based
in difference, is a constitutive element of what it is to be a human being. To
attack any of these differences-to round up women because they are women,
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Genocide impoverishes the world in the same way that losing an entire
distinctive species-the pandas, the Siberian tigers, the rhinos-impoverishes
the world over and above the loss of the individual pandas or tigers or rhinos.
Lemkin discovered a terrible pattern in the opaque mass of Nazi laws and
regulations in occupied Europe. Oppression and massacre appear throughout
human history, but Lemkin found something more than oppression and
massacre. He found an attack on human group plurality itself. He found
genocide.
"Genos" is the Greek word for a clan or tribe, and Lemkin coined his
terrible word to underscore that the plurality of peoples, with their different
ways of inhabiting the world, is a basic source of value, not-as fanatics would
have it-a threat to the One True Way or the One Authentic Race.3" Thus, as a
deep pluralist, he focused on groups not as aggregates of individual members,
but as groups as such. The drafters of the Genocide Convention were faithful to
Lemkin's pluralism when they devised the legal formula that distinguishes
genocide from other forms of atrocity: genocide involves a specific intent to
destroy a protected group as such.3 6
Independent of Lemkin, the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter came to
grips in their own way with Nazi rule in Europe. Like Lemkin, they recognized
that the Nazis practiced policies of atrocity and annihilation that were not
traditional war crimes. These crimes instead consisted of organized attacks on
already-conquered civilian populations-and at Nuremberg, these attacks were
labeled crimes against humanity.37 But the Nuremberg Charter's drafters
Jews because they are Jews, whites because they are whites, blacks because
they are blacks, gays because they are gay-is to attack the shared element that
makes us what we are as a species.
Ignatieff, Lemkin's Word at 27-28 (cited in note 29). This gets the idea almost, but not quite, right.
We are indeed "differentiated by race, religion, ethnicity, and individual difference"-but the first
three are differentiations by gromp, while individual difference is not. Genocide attacks the specific
value attached to groups, over and above the specific value attached to individual difference. For
further discussion see David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 Yale J Intl L 89, 11416 (2004).
35

Ignatieff insightfully notices that genocidal thinking is utopian thinking:
The danger of genocide lies in its promise to create a world without enemies.
Think of genocide as a crime in service of a utopia, a world without discord,
enmity, suspicion, free of the enemy without or the enemy within. Once we
understand that this utopia is the core of the genocidal intention, we have to
realize that this utopia menaces us forever.

36

37

Ignatieff, Lemkin's Word at 25 (cited in note 29).
For the moment, I am omitting some words from the legal formula, because, as I suggest, these
words distort and weaken Lemkin's insight. Subsequently I will examine the formula in its
entirety.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Aug 8, 1945), art 6(c), 59 Stat 1544,
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approached the task of defining these novel crimes very differently from
Lemkin, and the result was a definition that did not focus on the values of group
pluralism.
The Nuremberg Charter limited its scope to crimes connected with the
38
war. But in former Yugoslavia, crimes against humanity were committed in an
internal armed conflict rather than a traditional war; and in Rwanda they
occurred in areas of the country untouched by war. Jurists responded by refining
the definition of crimes against humanity to pare away the war nexus and to
emphasize the essential quality that turns rapes and murders from domestic
crimes into crimes against humanity: widespread or systematic attacks on civilian
populations that result from state or organizational policies.3 9 The definition
does not emphasize the nature or value of the victim groups "as such."
We may understand the difference between the legal definitions of
genocide and crimes against humanity in the following way: the law of crimes
against humanity focuses on the political, organized, group character of the
perpetrators, while genocide focuses on the group character of the victims. To
be sure, by definition, crimes against humanity must be committed against
civilian populations, that is, against groups. But for the Nuremberg framers, the
victims could be any civilian population under attack, including populations that
mix multiple groups. 40 There is in fact a studied vagueness in the concept of a
"civilian population," but the most natural way to think of it is territorially. For
example: the civilian population of the village of Amaki Sara, in Darfur province,

38

1547, 82 UN Treaty Ser 279, 288 (1945) (hereinafter Nuremberg Charter), reprinted in 1 Intl
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Tnal of the Major War Criminals Before the InternationalMilitagy Tribunal,
Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 10 (1947).
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter defines crimes against humanity as "murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated" (emphasis added). Id. The crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal referred to in the emphasized phrase are crimes against peace
(planning or carrying out an aggressive or illegal war) and war crimes. Id at arts 6(a), 6(b).

39

Luban, 29 Yale J Intl L at 97 (cited in note 34). For the relevant statutory language in its various
formulations see also id at 162-65. For the most current formulation see United Nations, Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/Conf 183/9 (1998) (hereinafter Rome
Statute). Under this definition, crimes against humanity include any of eleven specified offenses
"when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack." Id at art 7(1). And an "attack against a civilian population" is defined as
multiple commissions of the specific offenses "pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack." Id at art 7(2)(a).

40

Although the Nuremberg Charter does not define the phrase "civilian population," article 6(c)
refers to acts committed against "any civilian population," without restriction to political, racial,
national, religious, or other specific group categories. Nuremberg Charter, art 6(c) (emphasis
added) (cited in note 37).
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Sudan has been attacked, and the crimes against humanity of murder and rape
have been committed.
From a group pluralist point of view, the concept of crimes against
humanity fails precisely because it ignores the specific character of the target
groups, and the specific intention to diminish humanity by annihilating the
group as such. To be sure, the crimes against humanity include a crime called
"extermination." But the legal definition, though it requires extermination
committed in a planned, systematic attack, does not require a specific intent to
exterminate, nor does it require the targeting of a racial, ethnic, religious, or
national group "as such." From Lemkin's point of view, it misses the distinctive
pluralist dimension of human value that genocide assaults.41
From a practical point of view, as observed earlier, genocide is a harder
crime to prove than crimes against humanity, because of the difficulty of
proving specific intent. But that difficulty would not necessarily faze Lemkin.
Precisely because genocide is a unique and uncanny crime, it ought to be hard to
prove, because "mere" killers, even mass killers, should not be convicted unless
they truly intend to assault human plurality by destroying a group as such.
At this point, however, Lemkin stumbled in his quest for a "pure"
definition of genocide that would single it out from other mass atrocities. Under
the pure form of this definition, it is possible that nobody-not even Hider or
Bagosora-would be guilty of genocide. Hider planned to annihilate all the Jews
in Europe, but there is no reason to suppose that he planned to destroy the Jews
in the Americas as well. In his hatred and madness he may have wanted to do so,
but so far as we know he never planned to do so, and without a plan there is no
intention. In the same way, the architects of the Rwandan genocide planned to
kill the Rwandan Tutsis, but not the Tutsis of Burundi or of the Congo.4 2
The drafters of the Genocide Convention understood this, and they
responded by modifying the definition of genocide to include the attempt to
destroy a group "in whole or in part"-"in part" so that the intention to destroy

41

42

Lemkin also had a practical reason for wanting an intent-based definition. It allows prosecutions
for genocide even before masses of people have been killed, provided that the perpetrator has
genocidal intent. The crime of extermination, by contrast, presupposes mass killings. "The...
intent-based definition was essential if statesmen hoped to nip the crime in the bud." Power, 'A
Problemfrom Hell"at 65 (cited in note 28). On Lemkin's objection to the term "extermination" see
id at 54. Lemkin's motivation was similar to the reason for insisting that the "numbers
requirement" is misguided. On these issues, however, history has not borne out Lemkin's hopes.
Statesmen never nip the crime in the bud. Indeed, they seldom do anything substantial to halt
genocide, only to punish it after the fact.
This point is made in the ICTY Appellate Chamber's Krsc opinion. Prosecutorv Krstic, Case No IT98-33-A, Judgment,

13 (Apr 19, 2004).
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only the Jews of Europe or the Tutsis of Rwanda would still count as genocide
in the legal sense.
The problem is that once the definition is modified in this way, it loses its
mooring in the group-pluralist theory of value. A group that is destroyed only in
part is by the same token a group that survives in part, and so genocide by
destroying part of a group no longer removes that group from "the family of
man." Genocide by destroying part of a group continues to be a mass hate
crime, and as such it still contains the distinctive evil of all hate crimes-a
murderously anti-pluralist motivation on the part of the perpetrator. But it loses
the special moral-philosophical quality that requires singling it out from all other
mass killings and mass atrocities.43 In this way, Lemkin's definition of genocide
was compromised from birth: to make the crime prosecutable in a world of
territorial states, where genocide might occur only in one state or even one
sector of the state, the law drifted away from the pure group-pluralist vision that
drove him to distinguish genocide as a crime different from all others.
Lemkin himself understood this danger, and insisted that by "part of a
group" he meant a substantial enough part to have an impact on the group as a
whole.' The US Congress went further, specifying that the "part" destroyed
under genocide must be substantial enough that its loss would make the group
no longer viable within the nation.45 But once the group is reinterpreted as a
"group-within-a-given-territory," the difference between genocide and the crime
against humanity of extermination begins to thin dramatically. That is because a
group-within-a-given-territory is a "civilian population," and everywhere in the
world that people live among their own group, a civilian population is a groupwithin-a-territory. We can observe this thinning of the difference between
genocide and extermination by comparing Darfur with the first genocide
conviction to emerge from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"): the conviction of General Radislav Krstic for the
massacre of seven thousand Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica. 46
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In the conviction of General Krstic the threshold question was what group
the Serbs under Krstic's command intended to destroy. It was not Muslims as a
whole, or even Bosnian Muslims as a whole. Having no such powers, they
formed no such plans or intentions. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that the
Serbs aimed to destroy the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, a group that (the
Appellate Chamber explained) had a special symbolic resonance among the
Bosnian Muslims as a whole because Srebrenica was supposed to be a protected
enclave.47 In fact, Krstic's troops did not even intend to kill all the Bosnian
Muslims of Srebrenica, "only" the men of military age. Here, the Tribunal quite
reasonably concluded that killing these men would destroy the group as a
whole.48 Furthermore, the Tribunal reasoned that "forcible transfer could be an
additional means by which to ensure the physical destruction of the Bosnian
Muslim community in Srebrenica. The transfer completed the removal of all
Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica, thereby eliminating even the residual
possibility that the Muslim community in the area could reconstitute itself."'4 9
Compare the ICTY's analysis of Krstic's actions with the UN
Commission's analysis of the events in Darfur. Here, the UN Commission offers
as evidence against the attribution of genocidal intent the fact that the Janjaweed
sometimes kill only the men identified as rebels, sparing other men and the
women in their target villages-while "forcibly expel[ling] the whole
population. ' Killing men of military age while expelling everyone else sounds a
lot like Srebrenica. But here, deeds that the ICTY viewed as evidence of
genocide the UN Commission views as evidence of no genocide in Darfur. So
too, the ICTY in Krstic observed that "[t]he decision not to kill the women or
children may be explained by the Bosnian Serbs' sensitivity to public opinion"5 1
rather than signaling lack of genocidal intent. The UN Commission, on the other
hand, cites the failure of the Janjaweed or the Sudanese government to kill off
the targeted tribes entirely rather than placing them in camps as evidence of no
genocidal intent, rather than sensitivity to public opinion.52 Again, the similarity
with Srebrenica is striking, but the ICTY and the UN Commission reach
opposite conclusions on remarkably similar evidence.
Two points stand out. First, the comparison between Krstic and the UN
report suggests the disquieting possibility that the UN Commission ignored the
case law of genocide in reaching its no-genocide-in-Darfur conclusion (so
47
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convenient to UN member states that proclaim "never again!" about genocide
but don't actually wish to act). Indeed, the other pieces of no-genocide evidence
cited in the UN Commission's report are so remarkably shabby that they
reinforce the suspicion that the UN Commission was bending over backwards
to find no genocide in Darfur. The Commission notes that the Janjaweed have
refrained from attacking villages where both target and non-target groups liveas though somehow that shows a lack of specific intent to destroy the target
group as such.53 Obviously, it can just as easily show the opposite: the Janjaweed
are hostile only to the targeted group, and don't want to risk damage to other
groups. And the Commission cites an example where a man who willingly gave
up his camels to the Janjaweed was spared while his brother, who would not
give up his camel, was killed. 4 This, according to the Commission, shows lack of
genocidal intent. At most, however, it shows that the camel-thieves in this
incident lacked genocidal intent, not that the Darfur attacks as a whole lacked
genocidal intent. By the Commission's logic, the fact that Adolf Eichmann at
one point allowed a trainload of Hungarian Jews to escape to safety in return for
money is "evidence" that the Holocaust was not a genocide.55 Single incidents
prove nothing about organizational plans.
The no-genocide conclusion is especially striking because the UN
Commission explicitly states that, given the "limitations inherent in its powers,"
it would utilize a standard of proof weaker than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and indeed weaker than the existence of a prima facie case. The
Commission "concluded that the most appropriate standard was that requiring a
reliable body of material consistent with other verified circumstances, which
tends to show that a person may reasonably be suspected of being involved in
the commission of a crime."56 Admittedly, this is the standard of proof for
identifying individual perpetrators-but, logically, it should be the standard for
identifying crimes as well, because evidence "that a person may reasonably be
suspected of being involved in the commission of a crime" must include
evidence about what crime it is. On this remarkably weak standard-reliable
material consistent with verified circumstances that tends to show reasonable
suspicion-it is unfathomable that one would not find genocide in Darfur.
Second, the comparison of the Darfur Report with Krstic suggests that the
UN Commission was more faithful than the ICTY to Lemkin's uncompromised
53
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conception of genocide: the Commission was unwilling to concede that a
selective attack amounts to an assault on a group as such. But the ICTY had
simply carried to a logical conclusion the compromised conception of genocide
against a group in part, a group-within-a-territory-and so it was more faithful
to the law as it actually exists.
Above all, however, the comparison of Srebrenica with Darfur shows that
the modified conception of genocide, restricted to individual locales, has
converged with the crime against humanity of extermination to the point where
the two are almost interchangeable. Remarkably similar facts lead to a conviction
for complicity in genocide in Krstic, but to the conclusion that crimes against
humanity, but not genocide, are being committed in Darfur.
Admittedly, the distinction between the two crimes persists as a
definitional matter. A massacre of everyone in a village regardless of what group
they belong to will be an "extermination" but not a "genocide." But when, as is
typical in much of the world, people live among their own group, and the onegroup village falls target to atrocities committed by assailants who know very
well who lives there, even this distinction evaporates. The UN Commission
concludes that "black" villages in Darfur are targeted because these tribes
contain insurgents rather than because the Janjaweed intend to destroy the tribes
as such."7 But the Janjaweed clearly intend to destroy the tribes in part, that is, in
the insurgent regions where their villages are located. There may actually be no
fact of the matter about whether the Janjaweed intend to destroy the group in
the region "as such," or the group in the region because they are the enemy in
the region. The mens rea distinction between intended and foreseen-butunintended consequences makes sense in some contexts, but not when the
question is whether a category of people falls under attack because of one
characteristic rather than another, when the two characteristics go together and
the attackers dislike both.
IV. THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE PROTECTED GROUPS
Another definitional difference between genocide and extermination is that
the crime against humanity can include attacks against any civilian population,
including mixed populations, whereas genocide must (in the terms of the
Genocide Convention) be directed at certain classes of protected groupsnational, racial, religious, or ethnic groups.
Here, too, however, the law of genocide parts ways with the common
meaning of the word, and not for reasons that reflect any coherent moral vision.
The four categories of protected groups resulted from the politics of ratification,
57
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not from a moral argument that these alone are the kinds of human groups that
matter.58 Conspicuously absent from the list is the category of political groups.59
Political groups were included at various stages of the drafting process, but
ultimately removed from the final text of the Genocide Convention.60
Particularly vehement in opposing the category was the Soviet Union, which had
liquidated "enemy classes" on political grounds in the 1930s, and presumably did
not want to have that liquidation labeled genocide.6' As a result, the slaughter of
hundreds of thousands of Communists in Indonesia during 1965, the 'Year of
Living Dangerously," ironically does not count as genocide, because
Communists are a political group.62 Arguably, neither does the Cambodian autogenocide, where the targeted groups were designated because of the Khmer
Rouge's peculiar theory of social classes.63 Some international lawyers have
found legal arguments of questionable soundness to justify describing the
Cambodian slaughter as genocide-but the very fact that lawyers need to torture
the language of the Genocide Convention to call the Cambodian events
"genocide" shows clearly how far the law deviates from common moral
classification.6 4
The category of nationality also raises troubling questions. Lemkin meant it
to refer to national minorities, but in that case the term seems redundant with
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ethnicity. Nationality might also refer to citizenship-in which case it represents
only a lawyer's term of art, an artifact of immigration and naturalization statutes,
not a morally significant grouping of humanity. Finally, it might refer to the
inhabitants of a nation's territory. If so, however, it hardly differs from the
concept of a "civilian population" in the definition of crimes against humanity.
Ethnicity, as the UN Darfur Report makes clear, has also departed in its
legal meaning from the theory of group pluralism that animates Lemkin's
singling out of genocide as a special kind of crime. The evolving case law has
moved from defining ethnicity by objective characteristics such as shared
language and culture to subjective self-identification (we Tutsis are an ethnic
group if we think of ourselves as one)-and, crucially, to identification as an
ethnic group by others, namely the persecutors.6" Here, the crucial development
emerged in the ICTY's Jelisec judgment, which argued:
[1It is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or racial
group from the point of view of those persons who wish to single that
group out from the rest of the community. The Trial Chamber consequently
elects to evaluate membership in a national, ethnical or racial group using a
subjective criterion. It is the stigmatisation of a group as a distinct national,
ethnical or racial unit by the community which allows it to be determined
whether a targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group
in the eyes of the alleged perpetrators.6 6
Although it makes sense to view ethnicity from the perpetrator's point of
view-it is, after all, the perpetrator's intent that makes the crime a genocidedoing so abandons a central idea behind Lemkin's definition of genocide: that
membership in the ethnic group is an important source of value for the human
community. After all, the identification-by-others test of ethnicity implies that
the "ethnic group" may exist only in the imaginations of its persecutors.
In other words, there is no longer a principled reason for insisting that only
the categories of groups enumerated in the Genocide Convention deserve
protection because they have special value over and above the aggregated value
of their individual members. Indeed, some scholars have proposed broadening
the protections of the Genocide Convention to other groups, possibly to any
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group," and its jurisprudence has already broadened the protected categories to
some degree (for example, by including tribes). The broader the categories
become, the closer the legal concepts of a protected group under the Genocide
Convention and a "civilian population" under the law of crimes against
humanity draw to each other.
The fact is that "extermination" means destroying a group, and it simply
makes no sense to slice the metaphysical baloney so thin that there is a
difference between an exterminative attack on a civilian population in a given
territory and an intentional destruction of a group in that territory. They are two
names for the same thing.
The larger culture understands this far better than the lawyers do. When we
read about mass killings and rapes launched against civilian populations, we
think that that is genocide. When, in addition, we are told that these killings
amount to extermination, we know it is genocide. If the lawyers tell us that it is
not genocide because the group is not being exterminated as such but only
because they are insurgents, or farmers, we can only shake our heads at the
obtuse casuistry of the lawyers.68
The irony is that Lemkin's word, fashioned with exquisite fastidiousness,
has now become the enemy of Lemkin's life work, and the friend of politicians
seeking cover for inaction.
V. CONCLUSION: REDEFINING GENOCIDE
It is high time to revisit and revise the definition of genocide, to bring it
into line with its moral reality. Of course, there is a grave danger in reopening
the Genocide Convention and the Rome Treaty of the ICC. Once they are
reopened, everything in them is up for grabs, and who knows what the result
will be? Furthermore, confusion might result from tampering with a legal
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formula that is now firmly settled in the jurisprudence of many nations and the
international tribunals.
Fortunately, the modification I have in mind will not require any
fundamental changes in the legal formula for genocide. We should leave the
language of the Genocide Convention intact. Genocide will still consist of five
specified ways of destroying a protected group, with specific intent to destroy it,
in whole or in part, as such. The change will simply be to append to this
definition an additional seven-word clause: "or the crime against humanity of
extermination."
The idea is not to water down the concept of genocide, but to "upgrade"
the legal category of extermination by recognizing that it has the same core
meaning as genocide, and equal claim to the designation as the "crime of
crimes." Article II of the Genocide Convention would now read:
In the present Convention, genocide means
(A) any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (i) Killing
members of the group; (ii) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (iii) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (iv) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(v) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group;
or

(B) the crime against humanity of extermination.
In other words, mass killings in the course of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population, resulting from a state or organizational policy
(the legal formula for the crime against humanity of extermination) will now
count as genocide. And now, the estimated four hundred thousand dead in
Darfur will no longer "fall short of genocide," even in the Herald Sun of
Melbourne. Sudan will no longer be "cleared of genocide," even in the Glasgow
Herald. And one world-wide excuse for inaction in the face of mass atrocity will
no longer weigh on the conscience of the legal professions.
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